Since the end of the Cold War, we in Germany have not been used to putting these issues on the political and planning agenda. Nevertheless, we need to think about what contribution spatial planning can make to increasing the resilience (including redundancy) of spatial structures, especially with regard to taking precautions against the effects of sabotage and a possible armed conflict. What instruments can be used to implement this? Where can synergies be exploited with precautions against other current and potential crises (climate change, political fanaticism, further pandemics)?

These questions will be addressed by a newly established ARL ad hoc working group. Prof. Dr. János Brenner (Technische Universität Berlin) and Prof. Dr. Detlef Kurth (RPTU University Kaiserslautern-Landau) have taken over the leadership. Prof. Dr. Axel Priebs will take part on behalf of the Academy Presidium, while Prof. Dr. Andreas Klee will manage the committee. Other members of the ad hoc working group come from universities, non-university research institutes, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance and the Federal Office of Infrastructure, Environmental Protection and Bundeswehr Services, among others.

The members of the ad hoc working group plan to outline the contours of resilient spatial structures. The initial aim is to work towards a uniform understanding of resilience in terms of spatial planning and to define interfaces with urban planning. A modern spatial planning resilience strategy is to be developed, particularly in view of the current crisis situations, especially in geopolitical terms.

A major challenge is seen in the fact that the awareness of this topic, which has just begun, must be further increased and the "barriers to thinking" that have been built up must be removed. In addition, various confidentiality requirements, particularly on the part of the Bundeswehr, must be observed and a productive way of dealing with the tension between publicity and confidentiality must be found. How can information and location data of critical/military infrastructure be used despite the need for sensitivity and where is the limit of public negotiation? Is it perhaps even necessary to introduce a "second planning level" with limited public access?

From a thematic perspective, the following aspects should be addressed:

• Examination of the legal basis at federal and state level to determine whether and, if so, to what extent the requirements for a sharpened understanding of resilience are or can be taken into account in the spatial planning or state planning laws of the federal states.
• Examination of selected spatial planning plans at state and regional level also from this perspective.
• The task of spatial planning is not least to develop spatial functions, land uses and infrastructures in a resilient manner in order to avoid, as far as possible, damage to the power grid caused by military or terrorist attacks, for example, or to limit their negative effects. Therefore, one of the issues to be addressed is the protection of critical infrastructure, which is also supported by spatial planning.
• Redundancy also contributes to resilience: Specifically, this means, for example, that rail lines that are currently underutilized but could potentially take over the function of failed lines in the network should not be shut down prematurely. Power grids must also be designed with greater redundancy, which may also require additional space.
• Conflicts in urban areas are likely to increase, often as part of asymmetric warfare. From a realistic perspective, the protection of the civilian population and civilian infrastructure in potentially conflict-prone areas must also be given greater attention.
• In addition, more attention should be paid to the infrastructural links to Eastern Europe and the vulnerability of the data infrastructure.

It is planned to present a "Position paper from the ARL" on this in the near future.